Holdings
TIP
Re: Holdings
sortino schreef: ↑17 augustus 2019, 08:57Kan iemand vinden wat Pershing Square Holdings (noteert ook op Amsterdam) van Bill Ackman in port heeft. Vond op hun site alleen volgende met vermelding dat ze maar 9 (??) long posities hebben maar geen namen: https://pershingsquareholdings.com/wp-c ... 19-PSH.pdf
Zelfde vraag voor British Empire, wat sinds mei overigens AVI Global Trust noemt. Beleggen die alleen in andere holdings?
Waar vind je overigens van beide een lange historische grafiek? Google Finance kent die niet. Vond alleen van Pershing op De Tijd dat die in 2015 blijkbaar behoorlijk in mekaar gestuikt is en nadien velen jaren niks en dit jaar ineens wel.
Wou bovenstaande vooral weten om eens te zien waarin Bill Ackman zoal belegt, behalve dat hij recent Berkshire gekocht heeft.
https://finance.yahoo.com/news/bill-ack ... 48986.html
Als je verschillende maandrapporten van BTEM leest ga je ook veel informatie vinden over PSH en waarom dit hun grootste positie (bijna) is. Heb zelf beide in portefeuille ( Btem al jaren toen ze ook sofina nog in portefeuille hadden en PSH sedert 2018)
Re: Holdings
In de 31 juli 2019 managers comment van BTEM staat een uitgebreide update over hun grooste mono positie in PSH:
During the month, we wrote a public letter addressed to the Chairman of Pershing Square Holdings (PSH), which is the largest investment in AGT’s portfolio. This followed the announcement that the company planned to issue a $400 million bond with a 20-year maturity. Our view, expressed in detail in the letter, was that the issue of such long-dated debt would act as a poison pill in constraining the ability of the company to tackle its ballooning discount to NAV which, at the time of writing, sits at 31%. While the eventual terms of the debt showed some concessions (e.g. caps after ten years on the make-whole premium due in the event of early repayment, offering some protection against further falls in rates), and hinted at a portion of the proceeds being used to refinance existing debt, these do not change our fundamentally negative view of the issue.
Taking a step back, it is highly debatable whether PSH should be refinancing its debt at all, let alone using very long-dated debt to do so. Given the existing debt has been cited frequently in the past by the Board and by the Manager as an impediment to more aggressive share buybacks and/or tender offers, or other more structural solutions, there is a strong argument that it should be repaid in full at its maturity in 2022 and that the company should either be run on an unleveraged basis or levered using more flexible debt.
Aside from limiting the company’s ability to manage its discount, the additional gearing increases the option value of the manager’s performance fee (as performance fees can be viewed as a call option on NAV growth with the strike set at the high water-mark, the more leveraged the company is, the more volatile its NAV will be, and the more valuable is that option).
This is just one way in which the interests of the Manager are not entirely aligned with shareholders. Other obvious conflicts relate to their fees earned, which would diminish in line with any shrinkage in PSH’s asset base. There is another, which can also be understood and analysed as an option. While the Manager has made a very large personal investment in PSH, which we welcome wholeheartedly, it would be a mistake to see this as resolving the misalignment of interests found in almost all closed-end funds needing to act on their discounts. Given the Manager owns 20% of PSH’s share capital, is indelibly associated with the vehicle that bears its name, and that the fund was raised on the strength of its track record and distinctive investment strategy, it does not seem unreasonable to assume that the Manager could in effect elect to wind up the fund at their own discretion at a time of their choosing. As such, the Manager effectively owns a put option with a strike price set at a zero discount to NAV. As the discount to NAV widens, that put option increases in value to compensate for the mark- to-market loss on the PSH shares they own. Non-management shareholders have no such protection.
Taking yet another step back, the uncomfortable truth is that PSH owns a portfolio of highly-liquid large-cap stocks yet trades on a discount to a fully-marked-to-market NAV of 31%. We are old enough to remember the Manager commenting back in late-16 that they “find the current discount [then 21%] unacceptable”1, and to recall the Board’s comment a few months later that they “are not happy with the level and duration of the discount [then 15%]”2. We wonder what the Manager’s view would be if one of its investee companies traded at a 0.7x price/book ratio and attempted to justify a timid rate of share buybacks by decrying shareholders calling for more as short-term. Indeed, we have seen companies on the receiving end of activist campaigns by the Manager respond in such a fashion. Regardless of the Manager’s stance, one of the key attractions of closed-end funds is their independent boards of directors who have a duty to represent the best interests of shareholders. We have grave concerns that the Board of PSH seem to have been blind to the consequences of and conflicts surrounding the recent debt issue.
We invested in PSH over two years ago having conducted extensive due diligence on its portfolio and the Manager’s investment strategy and have benefitted from the strong NAV returns as performance has turned around. Our investment in the company has been one of AGT’s top contributors over 2019.
We continue to have a favourable view of the prospects for further share price appreciation from PSH’s portfolio of high-quality free cash flow-generative companies with limited CAPEX requirements, high returns on invested capital, and clear idiosyncratic drivers for earnings growth. During July, Starbucks (an estimated 13% of PSH’s NAV) posted its strongest same-store sales growth (+6%) since early-16 with traffic growth returning to the US as management-led initiatives to boost footfall began to bear fruit. Largest holding Chipotle Mexican Grill’s turnaround under its new CEO was confirmed in its Q2 report with a consensus-beating +10% increase in comparable sales, with digital sales a key driver and now accounting for 18% of total sales.
We now await a similar “turnaround” from the Board who bear responsibility for the discount suffered by shareholders.
The level of support from fellow shareholders following our public letter has been gratifying, and we thank those who got in touch. Any other shareholders in PSH wishing to discuss their views on the future of the
company are invited to contact us at tom.treanor@assetvalueinvestors.com
During the month, we wrote a public letter addressed to the Chairman of Pershing Square Holdings (PSH), which is the largest investment in AGT’s portfolio. This followed the announcement that the company planned to issue a $400 million bond with a 20-year maturity. Our view, expressed in detail in the letter, was that the issue of such long-dated debt would act as a poison pill in constraining the ability of the company to tackle its ballooning discount to NAV which, at the time of writing, sits at 31%. While the eventual terms of the debt showed some concessions (e.g. caps after ten years on the make-whole premium due in the event of early repayment, offering some protection against further falls in rates), and hinted at a portion of the proceeds being used to refinance existing debt, these do not change our fundamentally negative view of the issue.
Taking a step back, it is highly debatable whether PSH should be refinancing its debt at all, let alone using very long-dated debt to do so. Given the existing debt has been cited frequently in the past by the Board and by the Manager as an impediment to more aggressive share buybacks and/or tender offers, or other more structural solutions, there is a strong argument that it should be repaid in full at its maturity in 2022 and that the company should either be run on an unleveraged basis or levered using more flexible debt.
Aside from limiting the company’s ability to manage its discount, the additional gearing increases the option value of the manager’s performance fee (as performance fees can be viewed as a call option on NAV growth with the strike set at the high water-mark, the more leveraged the company is, the more volatile its NAV will be, and the more valuable is that option).
This is just one way in which the interests of the Manager are not entirely aligned with shareholders. Other obvious conflicts relate to their fees earned, which would diminish in line with any shrinkage in PSH’s asset base. There is another, which can also be understood and analysed as an option. While the Manager has made a very large personal investment in PSH, which we welcome wholeheartedly, it would be a mistake to see this as resolving the misalignment of interests found in almost all closed-end funds needing to act on their discounts. Given the Manager owns 20% of PSH’s share capital, is indelibly associated with the vehicle that bears its name, and that the fund was raised on the strength of its track record and distinctive investment strategy, it does not seem unreasonable to assume that the Manager could in effect elect to wind up the fund at their own discretion at a time of their choosing. As such, the Manager effectively owns a put option with a strike price set at a zero discount to NAV. As the discount to NAV widens, that put option increases in value to compensate for the mark- to-market loss on the PSH shares they own. Non-management shareholders have no such protection.
Taking yet another step back, the uncomfortable truth is that PSH owns a portfolio of highly-liquid large-cap stocks yet trades on a discount to a fully-marked-to-market NAV of 31%. We are old enough to remember the Manager commenting back in late-16 that they “find the current discount [then 21%] unacceptable”1, and to recall the Board’s comment a few months later that they “are not happy with the level and duration of the discount [then 15%]”2. We wonder what the Manager’s view would be if one of its investee companies traded at a 0.7x price/book ratio and attempted to justify a timid rate of share buybacks by decrying shareholders calling for more as short-term. Indeed, we have seen companies on the receiving end of activist campaigns by the Manager respond in such a fashion. Regardless of the Manager’s stance, one of the key attractions of closed-end funds is their independent boards of directors who have a duty to represent the best interests of shareholders. We have grave concerns that the Board of PSH seem to have been blind to the consequences of and conflicts surrounding the recent debt issue.
We invested in PSH over two years ago having conducted extensive due diligence on its portfolio and the Manager’s investment strategy and have benefitted from the strong NAV returns as performance has turned around. Our investment in the company has been one of AGT’s top contributors over 2019.
We continue to have a favourable view of the prospects for further share price appreciation from PSH’s portfolio of high-quality free cash flow-generative companies with limited CAPEX requirements, high returns on invested capital, and clear idiosyncratic drivers for earnings growth. During July, Starbucks (an estimated 13% of PSH’s NAV) posted its strongest same-store sales growth (+6%) since early-16 with traffic growth returning to the US as management-led initiatives to boost footfall began to bear fruit. Largest holding Chipotle Mexican Grill’s turnaround under its new CEO was confirmed in its Q2 report with a consensus-beating +10% increase in comparable sales, with digital sales a key driver and now accounting for 18% of total sales.
We now await a similar “turnaround” from the Board who bear responsibility for the discount suffered by shareholders.
The level of support from fellow shareholders following our public letter has been gratifying, and we thank those who got in touch. Any other shareholders in PSH wishing to discuss their views on the future of the
company are invited to contact us at tom.treanor@assetvalueinvestors.com
Re: Holdings
Fairfax financial
Noteert onder zijn boekwaarde terwijl Buffetsvehikel met een premie van 20% à 30% te koop is. Hiervoor zijn verschillende reden te bedenken maar neemt noet weg dat Prem Watsa in de long run toch indrukwekkende geannualiseerde returns heeft neergezet.
Portefeuille op 30/06/2019
There are 35 securities in the portfolio, but it is concentrated among a few large stakes. The focus of this article is on the larger (greater than 0.5% of the portfolio each) equity holdings. The top three positions are Seaspan (SSW), BlackBerry (BB), and Kennedy-Wilson Holdings (KW). Together, they account for ~60% of the entire 13F portfolio.
https://seekingalpha.com/article/428677 ... 019-update
Noteert onder zijn boekwaarde terwijl Buffetsvehikel met een premie van 20% à 30% te koop is. Hiervoor zijn verschillende reden te bedenken maar neemt noet weg dat Prem Watsa in de long run toch indrukwekkende geannualiseerde returns heeft neergezet.
Portefeuille op 30/06/2019
There are 35 securities in the portfolio, but it is concentrated among a few large stakes. The focus of this article is on the larger (greater than 0.5% of the portfolio each) equity holdings. The top three positions are Seaspan (SSW), BlackBerry (BB), and Kennedy-Wilson Holdings (KW). Together, they account for ~60% of the entire 13F portfolio.
https://seekingalpha.com/article/428677 ... 019-update
Re: Holdings
In de aandeelhoudersbrief van Watsa staat een uitgebreidere uiteenzetting van de waarde van iedere investering, verzekeringsbedrijf en overige bedrijven per aandeel. Zeker de moeite waard, dit verschaft een dieper inzicht in de waardeverdeling van het bedrijf. 13F bevat volgens mij alleen de posities die in de V.S. worden aangehouden.Phjo01 schreef: ↑21 augustus 2019, 10:05 Fairfax financial
Noteert onder zijn boekwaarde terwijl Buffetsvehikel met een premie van 20% à 30% te koop is. Hiervoor zijn verschillende reden te bedenken maar neemt noet weg dat Prem Watsa in de long run toch indrukwekkende geannualiseerde returns heeft neergezet.
Portefeuille op 30/06/2019
There are 35 securities in the portfolio, but it is concentrated among a few large stakes. The focus of this article is on the larger (greater than 0.5% of the portfolio each) equity holdings. The top three positions are Seaspan (SSW), BlackBerry (BB), and Kennedy-Wilson Holdings (KW). Together, they account for ~60% of the entire 13F portfolio.
https://seekingalpha.com/article/428677 ... 019-update
Re: Holdings
In beperkte mate bestaat dit wel. Zie portefeuilles PSP en PEX.
Amderszins bestaan er ook andere grspreide beleggingsvormen die meer ‘‘zuiver’ in investment holdings beleggen. Eat kleinere, boutque hedge funds en beleggingsfondsen. Ben alleen niet onder indruk van prestaties...
https://www.value-square.be/nl/business ... s-dbi-rdt/
https://www.value-square.be/media/2543- ... e-fund.pdf
https://oam.com.ky/documents/OAM-Europe ... tement.pdf
Of gewoon British Empire Trust
Re: Holdings
British Empire noemt is nu AVI global Trust geworden
Interessant maar helaas niet meer te koop bij Bolero.
Nog te koop bij andere brokers ?
Interessant maar helaas niet meer te koop bij Bolero.
Nog te koop bij andere brokers ?
Re: Holdings
Bij DeGiro wel te koop
Re: Holdings
Dieteren als een raket omhoog (+10%)op goede resultaten en inkoop eigen aandelen.
Gisteren ook resultaten Hal trust. NAV 155 €.Aan de huidige koers is deze holding koopwaardig.
Gisteren ook resultaten Hal trust. NAV 155 €.Aan de huidige koers is deze holding koopwaardig.
Buy and Hold(ing) belegger:Berkshire Hathaway,Brederode,GBL,Ackermans,Hal Trust,Sofina,Dieteren,Alphabet.
Re: Holdings
vinden bij bolero geen probleem , maar kopen niet mogelijk.
'geen essentiële informatiedocument beschikbaar '
'geen essentiële informatiedocument beschikbaar '
Re: Holdings
Ik vermoed dat het interessanter is van AVI te kopen als de pond lager staat? Wat denken jullie dat het effect gat zijn van een (harde) brexit op de pond en koers van AVI?
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anonymous38760
Re: Holdings
Effect op de pond, geen idee
Effect op de Avi koers, nihil als de rest van de wereld geen last heeft van de brexit. AVI heeft slechts 1% UK regio risk
Correctie: nihil in euros natuurlijk
Effect op de Avi koers, nihil als de rest van de wereld geen last heeft van de brexit. AVI heeft slechts 1% UK regio risk
Correctie: nihil in euros natuurlijk
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Henkie1984
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Re: Holdings
Bollore half year results vandaag (blijkbaar nabeurs?)
Succes mensen! Wens jullie mooie returns!
Re: Holdings
Odetjes alvast 5% naar boven